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CHAPTER I 
· Introduction to the Problem and a Review of Relevant Literature 
Previous investigations of the process of clinical assessment have 
centered around the validity of the clinicians' instruments as well as 
the validity and reliability of the clinicians' own judgmental process 
(Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1965; Gough, 1962; Hathaway, 1955; Little & 
Shneidman, 1959; Meehl, 1960). Inherent in these studies has been the 
controversy of actuarial versus clinical prediction (Gough, 1962; Meehl, 
1960; Sawyer, 1966; Taft, 1959). In many of these studies, the performance 
of clinicians in judgmental situations has not exactly been a call for 
optimism. Quite demonstrative of this was Little and Shneidman's study in 
which they compared individual blind diagnoses of experienced clinicians 
from several tests of personality and found that the clinicians agreed only 
slightly above chance. Similarly, Sawyer summarized a number of previous 
studies in comparing clinical prediction with mechanical or actuarial 
prediction, and found that users of a combination of the two methods seemed 
to outperform users of the pure clinical method alone. 
Also involved in the controversy over the validity of clinical 
judgment is the disconcertion of not a few researchers with clinicians 
and particularly psychodiagnosticians of projective tests -- who continue 
to report clinical observations and make clinical inferences which, according 
to the research evidence, are clearly erroneous. Chapman and Chapman 
(1967, 1969) have pointed out this phenomenon on two projective tests, the 
Draw-A-Person (DAP) and the Rorschach, as have Roeback (1968) and Swenson 
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(1968) more extensively on the DAP. The disconcertion of the researchers 
has ·led Meehl (1960) to conunent, 
Personally I find the cultural lag between what the published 
research shows and what clinicians persist in claiming to do 
with their favorite devices even more disheartening than the 
adverse evidence itself. (p. 26) 
Advocates of clinical judgment, intuition, or the inferential 
process, have counte~ed (with some justification) with the claim that the 
validity of the research evidence may be brought to question, and that the 
comparative techniques of tli.e researchers take clinical inference out of 
context and apart from the assessment process. Moreover, practicing 
clinicians maintain that their observations and inferences are substantiated 
through consensual validation with the similar observations of other 
clinicians. 
More recent investigations then have centered around the process of 
clinical inference. These studies have attempted to simulate the cognitive 
processes of the clinician as he makes his judgmental decisions. This 
research takes two related but somewhat different forms. First, those 
studies investigating the accumulation of information according to a 
linear additive or configural process (Anderson, 1972; Goldberg, 1968), 
and secondly, those studies which investigate factors influencing the 
clinician's selection and utilization of cues in diagnostic judgment 
(Chapman & Chapman, 1967,1969; Hunt & Walker, 1971). It is this second, 
albeit ambiguous, distinction with which this research is concerned, all 
the while keeping an eye to the earlier presented argument about the 
validity of clinical inference. 
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Process of Clinical Inference 
Thorne (1961) sees diagnosis as essentially a problem-solving process 
with the classic pattern being: 1) data collection, 2) data reduction, 
3) identification of pathognomic cues, 4) classification and categorization 
coding, 5) etiological diagnosis, 6) pathological diagnosis, 7) differential 
diagnosis, 8) nosological diagnosis, and 9) prognostic diagnosis. Thorne 
has noted that of these, data reduction and identification of pathognomic 
cues are the two most critical steps, and it is with these two processes 
that this research is most concerned. 
In the problem-solving step of data reduction, the judge utilizes 
both inductive and deductive reasoning. Inductively, he scans the test 
stimulus complex to gather cues and formulate an hypothesis. Deductively, 
having formulated an hypotfiesis about the personality of the subject, he 
attempts to find cues which verify or discontirm this hypothesis. 
In the problem-solving step of identifying the pathognomic cues, 
the judge must discriminate between those cues present which are indicative 
of a particular personality description and other irrelevant cues which, 
though present, are not indicative of that personality description. 
Thorne has here made a point highly relevant to the validity prob-
lem and to the clinician-versus-researcher controversy. A tentative ex~ 
planation for the lack of validity and reliability in clinical judgment 
may be the fact that clinical judges are not able to differentiate valid 
cues. This is, as will later be pointed out, the major theme of the 
Chapmans' studies, and it will also lie at the crux of the research 
design to be presented. 
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Hunt and Jones (1961) also spoke of the identification of appro-
priate cues under the heading of stimulus identification. They noted 
that the stimulus elements (cues) in a clinical judgment situation are 
largely unknown and ill-defined. This is immediately obvious in a brief 
glance at the research literature. Many of the hypotheses forwarded by 
projective test constructors have remained unexplored, and on quite a number 
of the hypotheses whi-ch have been researched, there is evidence both 
substantiating and disconfirming the importance of a particular sign as a 
pathognomic cue. The clinician' then, in making his judgment, must deal 
with global and complex stimulus situations, and he must identify the 
specific part stimuli which will provide him with the essential cues for 
making a judgment. 
Sarbin, Taft, and Bailey (1960) differentiated four stages in the 
cognitive activity of a clinician attempting to formulate an inference: 
1) scanning, 2) scrutinizing, 3) probing, and 4) soliciting. Scanning 
is defined as an unbiased sweeping of the entire set of cues to detect 
cues relevant to the current enterprise. Scrutinizing involves a more 
active search for the relevant cues, while probing and soliciting are 
more advanced forms of inferential investigation. In this instance, the 
element of prime concern, again, is with how the judge scans the cue 
complex to detect relevant cues. 
Gardner (1961) has noted individual differences in this scanning 
principle. He has found the ability to focus on relevant cues and to 
not attend to irrelevant cues to be independent.of the cues in the stimulus 
complex. He calls this a "field articulation ability," or the ability to 
concentrate on certain cues and to ignore illusion-producing cues. 
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Studies on the factors influencing the selection and utilization 
of cues have investigated several variables, among them number of cues 
utilized, effects of immediate feedback, ~d the conceptual frame of 
reference of the clinician. It is to this last problem of clinician bias 
and original judgmental frame of reference that Chapman and Chapman (1967, 
1969) relate. In a series of studies on factors influencing clinic~l 
judgment, they have demonstrated how prior expectations of the relationships 
between cues and criteria can lead to faulty observation and inference. 
Moreover, their results indicate that judges who systematically make 
invalid associations of pathognomicity to certain cues derived from pro-
jectiv~ protocols, may in fact be reactipg to the prior expectation of 
cue (sign) and symptom based on word associatio~, rather than to the valid 
and relevant cues pYesent in t.~e protocol. 
Systematic Error in Clinical Report 
Examples of systematic error of various kinds have been reported by 
psychologists investigating other behavioral phenomena. Thorndike (1920a) 
proposed the halo effect after studying the ratings of officers made by 
their superiors in the army. Thorndike defined his halo effect as a 
marked tendency or constant error toward suffusing ratings of specific 
features wit.ti a positive quality belonging to the individual as a whole. 
Another example, the Muller-Lyer illusion (Krech et al., 1969) occurs 
in perceptual phenomena. The classical Muller-Lyer includes two horizontal 
lines of the same length which appear unequal because of the opposite 
directions of arrowheads attached to either end. The Muller-Lyer illusion 
is an example of a part being dependent on the nature of a whole. Such a 
part-whole relationship generalizes to problem solving and to stereotyping 
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and is usually associated with the perceptual effects referred to as one's 
"frame of reference." Loevinger (1965) has pointed to the presence of 
systematic error running through items of ~ating scales. The effect of the 
systematic error here is to raise item homogeneity and to thus increase 
and inflate the correlation of that test with other tests which have the 
. . 
same error. Loevinger noted that this correlation seduces many psychologists 
into clinging to a weak item form even when the incurring· weakness of such 
an effect is pointed out. 
The Chapmans believe that the principles of systematic error can 
be generalized regardless of the subject matter involved. Thus, errors in 
clinical observations are the same as sup~rstitions, beliefs in magic, and 
social prejudice in that all are based on systematic error in the reports 
of observations of a supposed correlation between two classes of events. 
The Chapmans call this report of a correlation not warranted by the facts 
an "illusory correlation." "Correlation" here is not taken in the 
statistical sense, but is taken to mean co-occurrence; that is, an 
occurrence of one event tends to imply the occurrence of another. An 
illusory correlation may include both systematic and random error, and 
can occur under one or more of three conditions: 1) when two classes of 
events are not correlated, 2) when two classes of events are correlated 
to a lesser extend than reported, and 3) when two classes of events are 
correlated in the opposite direction of that reported. 
As applied to clinical judgment, illusory correlation includes 
erroneous reports of correlations between symptoms of patients and their 
performance on diagnostic tests. This is particularly apparent when 
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performance on these tests is interpreted in terms of signs which can be 
derived from the stimulus complex of test responses. For example, on 
the DAP, "eye" or "elaboration of the eye•: appears to have some unmeasured 
relationship of a cognitive or semantic nature -- and thus some associative 
value -- to "paranoia." 
Loren Chapman (1967) noted the presence of reported illusory 
correlations between pairs of words which have associative properties and 
properties of distinctiveness. Two words may have associative properties 
when they are similar in meaning and associatively related. For example, 
"table" and "chair" have a high associative value because of their frequent 
occurrence with each other, as do "flag". and "banner" which are similar 
in meaning. Properties of distinctiveness are those properties which 
e<lsily di..ffE'ri:!:r>tiate 2. \<?ord pair from other words of a list. An cxwr.plc 
would be a pair of three syllable words among pairs of one syllable words. 
Chapman and Chapman (1967) generalized this systematic error to 
the clinical situation with six studies on the DAP. The purposes of their 
strategies were ~o determine the extent of illusory correlation in clinical 
observation, to investigate the bases of these errors, and to investigate 
the conditions under which these errors occur. 
In order to test their hypothesis of illusory correlation in a 
quasi-clinical situation, the Chapmans needed to use a test and a symptom 
for which both valid and invalid signs have been reported by clinical 
researchers. They noted the controversy over sign interpretations of the 
DAP and selected that projective test. Thus, they set out to prove that 
the popular meanings being reported by clinicians were illusory correlations 
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based on verbal associative connection of the test sign to the symptom, 
rather than on the clinicians' valid observations. 
First of all, they needed to kno~ how clinicians used the DAP. 
Therefore, they sent a survey to 110 practicing psychodiagnosticians to 
learn the characteristics of the drawings that the diagnosticians reported 
that they had observed. Their survey took the form of six symptom state-
ments: 1) he is worried about how manly he is; 2) he is suspicious of 
other people; 3) he is worried about how intelligent he is; 4) he is 
concerned with being fed and taken care of by other people; 5) he has had 
problems of sexual impotence; 6) he is worried that people are saying bad 
things about him. For each of these six symptom statements, the 
diagnosticians were asked to assume that the patient was a man and to 
list what the drawings of each would be characterized by. With this data 
they were able to compare reports made by clinicians with similar observa-
tions made by undergraduate observers performing the role of "beginning 
clinicians" in a quasi-clinical situation. 
In their first study of this strategy, the Chapmans presented 
to undergraduate observers a series of DAP drawings, each of which was 
paired with two contrived symptoms of the alleged patient who drew it. 
By looking through the drawings (for a brief period of 30 seconds each) 
the observers were supposedly accumulating "clinical experience" as to 
the meaning of different aspects of performance on the DAP. The drawings 
and symptom statements were paired in such a way that there was no 
relationship between the occurrence of any symptom and any drawing 
characteristic (sign) viewed as its correlate in conventional clinical 
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practice. The drawings which were used were obtained from 35 di.agnosed 
psychotics and ten gradua~e students. 
Two of the six symptom statements.given above appeared paired 
together on each card. Each of the six symptom statements was paired with 
every other statement in the set, thus making 15 possible pairs. A set 
of 45 different cards was used. Thus, each symptom statement was paired 
with every other symptom statement three times in the set of 45 cards, and 
each pairing appeared on a different card. 
The hypot:hesis to be tested was that naive observers would 
"rediscover" the same widely accepted correlates of. the six symptoms that 
clinicians erroneously use. The alternate hypothesis to follow was that 
if naive observers report the same correlates, shared systematic errors 
must be inferred. Moreover, if these were the same correlates that 
clinicians used, one might suspect that clinicians would show these same 
systematic errors. 
After viewing the pictures, the subjects were asked to list the 
characteristics of each picture for each of the six symptom statements. 
The results (partially given in Table 3) indicated that the observers 
showed massive illusory correlation and, that the illusory correlations that 
they reported showed remarkable similarity to the correlates that clinicians 
had reported from their clinical practice. Moreover, statistical cross-
checks revealed that the observers saw each drawing characteristic as 
occurring with one symptom more than others, that the observers agreed 
on which symptom was with which characteristic, and that the correlates 
reported were not actually present in the test data. 
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In order to get at the associative basis of this illusory 
correlation, the Chapmans distributed a questionnaire to subjects who did 
not participate in the first task. The purpose of this questionnaire was 
to measure the associative strength between the problem area and the 
parts of the body referred to in various drawing characteristics. Each 
of the six problem areas was paired with seven body parts, giving 42 pairings 
in all. The format of the questionnaire ran as follows: "The tendency of 
SUSPICIOUSNESS to call to mind HEAD is • (a) very strong, (b) strong, 
(c) moderate, (d) slight, (e) very slight, (f) no tendency at all." The 
responses from (a) to (f) were assigned values from six to one respectively. 
The results were congruent with the earl.ier Chapman (1967) study; namely, 
the strongest associative connections were between signs and symptoms of 
the most often reported j JJ u.sory correlA.tions. 
In the other five studies of the series on the DAP, the Chapmans 
repeated the task to the same observers on three consecutive days, 
presented the symptom statements without the accompanying drawings to 
determine amount of prior expectation, introdu~ed negative correlations, 
and attempted to maximize the motivation of the observers. The illusory 
correla~ion phenomenon showed great resistance and was not markedly 
affected by these procedures. 
The Chapmans (1969) also applied the illusory correlation or 
systematic error phenomenon to Rorschach content analysis. They selected 
erroneous signs (those which the literature failed to support), valid 
signs (those which the literature did support), and essentially neutral 
signs from Wheeler's :(!O signs of homosexuality. They again surveyed 
11 
practicing clinicians, determined the word associative strength of the 
sign and symptom pairs, and generally found the reports of clinicians 
and undergraduate observers to agree. Moreover, both clinicians and 
observers preferred invalid signs to valid signs in reporting illusory 
correlates on the invalid signs. Their 13 conditions with almost 700 
judges repeatedly verified the presence of illusory correlation, and further 
testified to its hardiness. 
Starr and Katkin (1969) investigated the phenomenon of illusory 
correlation using.Rotter's Incomplete Sentences Blank (ISB). They surveyed 
practicing clinicians to determine what responses these clinicians had 
observed with particular personality characteristics. They then presented 
to clinical graduate students, non-clinical graduate students, and under-
graduate students ISB sentence stems and completions with paired statements 
from a pool of five problem statements; Only five subjects (of 60) 
correctly maintained that there was no relationship between the sentence 
completions and the problem statements, and thus were not susceptible to 
the illusory correlation. Moreover, the reported correlates were quite 
similar to those reported by the clinicians in the survey. 
Golding and Rorer (1972) investigated illusory correlation with 
Rorschach responses. They chose Chapman and Chapman's (1969) paradigm 
using valid and invalid signs of homosexuality. Golding and Rorer 
determined the ~ priori expectations of undergraduate judges for a cue 
to ~e associated with a particular symptom, an~ then tested two types of 
feedback conditions -- simultaneous and predictive. Simultaneous feedback 
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occurred when the statements appeared on the cards with the pictures as 
in the Chapmans' designs (1967, 1969). In this feedback condition, 
the subjects were able to study the cue and symptom simultaneously on 
each trial. rn·prediction feedback, each subject was given a cue and was 
required to predict the symptom before he was allowed to see the true value 
of the symptom. This training resulted in a decrease in the report of 
illusory correlation. Nevertheless, the reports of illusory correlation 
were still far greater than chance. Nor were there any differential effects 
between the types of feedback given. 
The Chapmans have noted that their findings of illusory correlation 
as reported by clinicians do not in themselves give evidence of personality 
qualities leading to deficits of judgment, but that they do clearly point 
out some of the difficulties inherent in the clinician's task. Golding 
and Rorer, did find consistent and strong differences among subjects in the 
nature of their response behavior. Subjects significantly differed from 
one another in the probabilities that they assigned to cue-symptom 
relationships as well as in their response to the conditions of training 
which were aimed at eliminating the report of illusory correlation. Fiske 
(1971) has noted that human judgment has deficiencies and that these 
deficiencies must be assessed to determine generalizability over judges, 
situations, and conditions. Therefore, it seems a wise course to pursue 
the illusory correlation phenomenon of the Chapmans to see if this error 
is indeed generalizable to all judges or whether judges highly susceptible 
to the error and who make unwarranted associations of sign and symptom 
present personality characteristics which reliably differ from judges who 
are not as susceptible to systematic error. 
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Personality Correlates of Interest 
The amount of research on personality characteristics of the clinical 
judge is not impressive in sheer volume. Literature specific to the charac-
teristics involved in the reading of the cues and to the association of 
cues with symptoms of pathognomicity is even more noticeably lacking. Most 
of the studies which are available consider the ju_dgmental process of the 
clinician on a more global scale and thus report more global personality 
characteristics of various qualities of judges. Adams (1927) and Vernon 
(1933) distinguished the good judge of others and the good judge of self. 
However, their reported characteristics did not include measures of specific 
abilities. Kelly and Fiske {1951) performed one of the more extensive in-
vestigations of the abilities and personality characteristics of the 
clinician. However, here again, the correlation of specific traits with 
the personality of the good judge were not remarkably high. Nor did Kelly 
and Fiske present measures which would address the specific ability to 
respond to valid or invalid cues. 
Thus, it may be necessary to look at c_ogni ti ve processes and to infer 
the possible influence of these processes on clinical judgment. First to 
be considered are field dependence and field independence. In considering 
whether a judge responds to a present relationship between cue and symptom, 
or whether or not he selects relevant cues, the ability to detect the cue 
in the stimulus complex would seem to be of prime importance. Witkin (1962) 
has demonstrated that people differ in cognitive style and that they have 
characteristic, self-consistent ways of functioning in their perceptual 
and intellectual activities. He has demonstrated that some people have an 
ability to analyze a complex configuration and to respond to specif~c 
parts of it, ignoring other parts. To these people he attributes the trait 
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of field independence. Conversely, people who have difficulty eliciting 
a specified part from the whole complex are labeled field dependent. 
Witkin and later researchers have also found particular personality 
. 
characteristics to be associated with each of these types of cognitive 
styles. Field dependent persons have been found to be in need of more 
support and guidance from others. They are thus particularly attentive 
to facial characteristics and expressions which provide cues to other 
people's attitudes and moods. Field dependent persons characterize them-
selves and others in terms of "external" attributes. Messick and Damarin 
(1964) found field dependent people to have a better incidental recall of 
photographs and to be relatively better ~t recognizing people they have 
seen only briefly before. Field independent per~ons, however, are better 
at incidental recall of jtems given in a stimulus complex. 
If, as the Chapmans and others have suggested, reporters of illusory 
correlations or utilizers of invalid cues are relying on prior expectations, 
perhaps they are doing so because of an inability to select some part from 
the complex stimulus configuration of the projective test protocol. Field 
dependent persons should more readily form proper cue-symptom relationships 
because of their attentiveness to expressed affective cues of others. How-
ever, it may be that their global handling of the affective cues int~rferes 
with their observation of frequency of cue~symptom pairings. Thus, one 
might hypothesize that those more susceptible to the systematic error of 
word association of sign and symptom are more field dependent than are 
those who are not as susceptible and who are thus free to see cues and their 
symptoms in proper relationships. 
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A second variable to be considered is creativity. In their book 
on creative thinking, Wallach and Kogan (1965) considered Guilford's (1967) 
mode of divergent thinking. Divergent thil}king can roughly be described 
as thinking in different directions, and as searching for variety. Considered 
within this domain are the cognitive units of originality, expressional 
fluency, ideational fluency, word fluency, and associational fluency. One 
aspect of the capacity to generate these cognitive units is the limit of 
a person's behavioral repertoire of cognitive productions. Thus, Wallach 
and Kogan define creativity as the capacity to store cognitive elements. 
Mednick (1962) differentiated two variables which reflect individual 
differences in creativity. First of all,. there is the total number of 
associations of which a person is capable; and secondly, is the relative 
tmiqui:>n~ss that his associations possess. Gradients of abl:>uciative 
response strength are different for high and low creative persons, and 
these gradient slopes represent the emission potential of the person. To 
use Mednick's example, if the word "table" is presented, the highly stereo-
typic response would be "chair." The stereotypic responses are high in a 
person's hierarchy, while the unique associates are lower in the hierarchy. 
The sharply-sloped gradient of available responses which defines the less 
creative person contains the responses of greatest stereotypy. The shallow-
sloped gradient of available responses which defines the more creative 
person represents a larger number of available cognitive elements. Thus, 
a person who can be represented by the shallow gradient will most likely 
offer stereotyped associates to begin with, just as the person operating 
under the sharp gradient. However, when the less creative person (repre-
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sented by the sharp slope) exhausts his repertoire of responses, the more 
creative person (represented by the shallow slope) will continue responding 
with increasingly unique associates. Thus, the word association behavior 
of the highly creative individual should be characterized by less stereotypy 
and commonality. 
The Chapmans (Chapman, 1967; Chapman & Chapman, 1967) have pre-
sented strong evidence testifying that one basis of illusory correlation 
is the word association between symptom and cue. The most oft-reported 
illusory correlates are those with the strongest cue-symptom word association. 
Thus, one might suspect that those persons most susceptible to the illusory 
correlation phenomenon ~re less creative than those who are less susceptible 
to the illusory correlation. 
Another variable to be considered is social intelligence. The ability 
to read and to react to affective cues from another person and to respond 
with appropriate affect is the essence of the ability termed social insight, 
or social intelligence (Guilford, 1967; Thorndike, 1920b). This ability 
appears to be closely related to the cognitive processes of creativity in 
that both are prominent correlates of sensitivity to physiognomic properties. 
These physiognomic properties are those of a cue presentation which provide 
information about the affective or emotional significance (sadness, fear, 
weakness, etc.) of such stimuli. Reading the stimulus cues to detect 
physiognomic properties requires the positing of a symbol-referent relation 
between a visual pattern and an emotional state. Thus, a particular visual 
configuration signifies a particular affect. The ability to posit such 
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a relationship between cue and affect is the product of a learned inference, 
and it thus varies from person to person. Creativity and social intelligence 
differ in that creativity refers to the capacity for production of relation-
ships between visual patterns and emotional states, while social intelligence 
refers to the ability to understand the social consequences of pattern-
state relationships· and to then produce behaviors acting in accordance with 
such an understanding. The judge high in so~ial intelligence possesses more 
of the ability to detect the social consequences and affective tone of a 
cue configuration. Consequently, when attempting to infer personality 
characteristics from the cues presented. on a test protocol, the person 
with greater social intelligence should make more valid associations of 
cue and symptom. In addition, if such a person is more readily aware of 
the social consequences, one might suppose that he is more aware of external 
cues as well. Thus, one might suspect that a person high in social 
intelligence is likewise aware of frequency of cues and that he therefore 
would be less susceptible to the illusory correlation phenomenon. 
A fourth personality-related dimension which might properly be 
considered is the confidence with which a judge designates a cue or set of 
cues to be indicative of a symptom. This confidence should reflect the 
degree to which that association is learned (Hunt & Jones, 1961). If the 
Chapmans are correct that illusory correlation is a learned verbal 
association and that such a learned verbal association represents greater 
stereotypy, then one would expect in this instance that the judges who 
report invalid signs would express more confidence in their choices. 
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A fifth consideration is that the number of cues utilized may be 
related to success. Wescott (1968), in studying intuitive problem solving 
with his Test of Intuitive Problem Solving! failed to find a positive 
correlation between success and number of cues utilized. Hunt and Walker 
(1971) did find success and number of cues to be positively related. Westcott 
noted that some subjects apparently possessed the ability and did extract 
more information than did others. His findings did indicate that the 
probability of success increased with additional information. If reporters 
of illusory correlations are reporting stereotypic learned relationships, 
then it can be expected that they would utilize a lesser number of cues 
in making a judgmental inference. 
Choosing an Experimental Paradigm 
Determining the personalit~l characteristics and ab:i.lit:tes of the 
highly error-prone judge and less error-prone judge requires a controlled 
situation in which all judges are reviewing the same test stimuli with 
the same amount of background information. In order to simulate a 
clinical situation in which judges review test stimuli and then must make 
a decision about the personality of the patient, the paradigm used by the 
Chapmans will be employed. Goldberg's (1968) acclamation of the Chapmans' 
studies as "one of the most ingenious studies of clinical judgment ever 
made" certainly singles out their methodology for consideration. 
If one attempts to replicate the Chapmans' discovery of illusory 
correlations in clinical observations, there is a choice between their 
design on the DAP or their design on the Rorschach. While the Rorschach 
design offers the advantage of differentiating valid and invalid signs, 
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the DAP more closely resembles a judgmental situation involving clinical 
inference based on subjective associations of cues and symptoms. The 
essential elements of investigation are th~ personality characteristics of 
the judges or observers. The DAP will suffice to differentiate those 
judges who report illusory correlations {cue-symptom relationships which 
are not present) of a highly stereotypic, associative nature, and those 
judges who report relationships of a less associative nature. The former 
judges will be designated as those highly susceptible to the illusory 
correlation phenomenon, while the latter judges will be designated as those 
less susceptible to illusory correlation. 
The hypotheses to be tested are that judges who are highly susceptible 
to illusory correlation: 1) are more field dependent, 2) score lower on 
tests of creativity, 3) score lower on tests of social intE:!lllgern.:e, 4) a:r:e 
more confident in their choice of cues, and 5) utilize a lesser number of 
cues than judges who are less susceptible to illusory correlation. 
CHAPTER II 
Method 
Subjects 
Ninety-two male undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course at Loyola University served as subjects. They were questioned for 
previous experience with the DAP, but no subjects reported any prior 
experience with this instrument. Twenty-two subjects participated in 
Experiment I, the reliability design, but were not permitted to participate 
in Experiment II, the personality correlates design. Twenty-one of those 
twenty-two subjects returned for the second testing. Seventy subjects 
participated in Experiment II and are henceforth referred to as judges. 
Task Materials 
The materials used and the procedure of stimulus administration 
approximated those of the Chapmans as closely as possible. The drawings 
were, in fact, the same as those employed in the Chapman design,* which 
were collected from ten nonpsychotics and 35 psychotics. Xerox reproductions 
were obtained of each drawing, and each drawing was backed by cardboard and 
covered with clear plastic to protect it from the effects of handling. 
Six symptom statements were used for pairing with the drawings. 
The six symptom statements were: 
1. He is worried about how manly he is. 
2. He is suspicious of other people. 
3. He is worried about how intelligent he is. 
4. He is concerned with being fed and taken care of by other people. 
5. He has had problems of sexual impotence. 
6. He is worried that people are saying bad things about him. 
* The author would like to thank Loren Chapman for generously sharing his 
stimulus drawings. 
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Printed on the same sheet of paper as each drawing were a pair of 
the above statements purporting to represent symptoms of the patient who 
made the drawing. All possible pairs (lS) of the six symptom statements 
were used. Each pairing appeared three times to make a total set of 45 
cards. Thus, each symptom statement appeared on 15 different cards. In 
order to prevent a relationship between the occurrence of each symptom 
and any of the drawing characteristics expected (that is, any of the 14 
drawing characteristics which the Chapmans obtained from their survey of 
clinicians) , the Chapmans had had each drawing ranked according to the 
presence of each characteristics. Thus, assigning symptom statements to 
drawings was done in such a way that no systematic relationship existed 
between the occurrence of a symptom and any drawing characteristic. 
This was accomplished by pairing the symptom statcmont equally often with 
the drawings having each of various degrees of possession of the drawing 
characteristic. For example, the symptom statement, ''He is worried about 
how intelligent he is." was paired as often with drawings having small 
heads as with large or medium-sized heads. This prevented any actual 
correlation between cue and symptom. 
Experiment .!_ 
Chapman and Chapman (1967} indicated that a group of judges reported 
similar percentages of illusory correlates for the same cues in the repetition 
of the task on three consecutive days. Nevertheless, this did not clearly 
establish that the same judges were reporting the same illusory correlates 
on each of these three presentations. To test the reliability of this 
phenomenon for individual judges over successive administrations, Experiment I 
was employed. 
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Procedure 
In Experiment I, twenty-two subjects were tested in a group setting. 
The experimenter first presented a brief' description of the DAP and its 
clinical use, explaining that psychologists make interpretations about 
patients' emotional problems from the nature of their drawings, No ex~ 
amples of drawing ~haracteristics were offered. 
The following instructions were then given: 
Now we want to test your powers of judgment and observation. I am 
going to show you some drawings made by men with various emotional 
problems. Together with each drawing you will find two statements 
that describe the emotional problems of the man who made the drawing. 
Many of the men have some of the same problems. Please study the 
pictures and the statements carefu~ly because when you are through 
I am going to ask you about the characteristics of the drawings that 
were made by men with each kind of problem~ 
Each subject was handed a drawing f;::i.ce down. At a signal, the 
subjects looked at the card for 30 seconds and on signal passed the card 
on, receiving a new card in the process. This was repeated every 30 
seconds until each of the subjects had seen each of the 45 drawings once. 
After all the subjects had seen all of the 45 drawings, a questionnaire 
was distributed to each subject with items of the following format: 
Some of the pictures which you saw were drawn by men with the following 
problem: 
"He is worried about how manly he is." 
Did you notice any general kind of thing or things which most often 
characterized the drawings made by men with this problem? 
Yes No 
------If your answer is yes, the pictures drawn by these men were more often 
characterized by: 
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A f?rmat like the above was constructed around each of the other five 
symptom statements as well. 
When all of the subjects had completed all six of the items, the 
subjects were asked to list the amount of confidence they felt in making 
the associations of signs and symptoms for each of the six statements on 
a scale of: 
(1) Guessed, (2) Rather uncertain, (3) Fairly certain, (4) Rather 
certain, (5) Positive. 
Two weeks later, the subjects were recalled. Twenty-one subjects returned 
and performed the same task with identical materials, instructions, and 
procedure. 
Experiment g 
Tne ::;tudies on illusory correlation indicale that the phenomenon 
is massively reported in nearly all conditions. Very few judges 
correctly indicate that there are no cue-symptom relationships present. 
Since there are no valid cue-symptom relationships present, any reporting 
of a relationship may be considered to be erroneous. Evidence seems to 
indicate that most judges are imbued with prior expectations of a cue-
symptom relationship and that this prior expectation may be the cause of 
the illusory phenomenon (Chapman & Chapman, 1967, 1969; Golding & Rorer, 
1972). In addition, the most popular illusory correlates are those of the 
highest associative strength, and, thus, are those of greatest prior 
expectation. Evidence from these studies suggests that the most popular 
illusory correlates are those which interfere with the reporting of valid 
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cue~symptom relationships. Thus, those judges who report the most 
popular illusory correlates may be identified as those highly susceptible 
to illusory correlation, while those judges who report no relationships 
or who do not report the most popular illusory correlates may be identified 
as those less susceptible to illusory correlation. The purpose of 
Experiment II then, was to differentiate between those judges highly 
susceptible to the illusory phenomenon and those judges less susceptible 
to the illusory phenomenon, and to compare scores of these highly suscep-
tible and less susceptible judges on personality-ability measures of 
field dependence-independence, social intelligence, and creativity. 
Procedure 
In Experiment II the seventy subjects were tested in groups 
varying in size from eight to seventeen. The materials, instructions, and 
procedure were the same as those of the task in Experiment I. The most 
commonly reported illusory correlations for each symptom statement in 
both Experiment~ I and II were compared with the most often reported 
correlates given by surveyed clinicians published in C~apman and Chapman 
(1967). 
Utilizing the Chapmans' information as criteria, scoring standards 
for two scales were formulated, one employing the most frequently reported 
(most "popular") drawing characteristic for each symptom statement as 
given by surveyed clinicians, and one employing the most popular responses 
given by the Chapmans' experimental undergraduate subjects. Thus, accord-
ing to each scale, the range of erroneous populars which an individual 
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subject could report observing across the six symptom statements extended 
from zero to six; that is, potentially one for each of the six symptom 
statements, Those judges who reported a· large number of illusory populars 
(four, five, or six} were considered highly susceptible to the illusory 
phenomenon, while those who reported no or few populars (zero, one, or two} 
were considered to be less susceptible to the illusory phenomenon. Since 
the results of the personality measures are to be generalized to practicing 
clinicians, more attention has been paid to the scale of the clinician 
responses (hereafter referred to as the "Clinician Scale"} as opposed to 
the scale of the student responses (hereafter referred to as the "Student 
Scale"}. 
Measures 
Five tests representing three personality characteristics and 
abilities were then group administered. The characteristics and measures 
are as follows: 
a} A test of field dependence, the Hidden Figures Test (HFT, 
Cf-1} (Witkin et al., 1962) was used to determine scores on 
a continuum of field dependence-independence. The HFT, Cf-1 
resembles the Witkin Embedded Figures Test in that it 
measures the ability to recognize a figure hidden among 
other lines. 
b) Two of Wallach and Kogan's (1965) creativity tests were 
utilized to determine level of creativity. Two items of 
Alternate Uses ("cork," "chair") and two items of Similarities 
were employed ("watch-typewriter," "curtain-rug"). 
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c) Two of Guilford's tests (O'Sullivan & Guilford, 1966), 
Cartoon Predictions and Expression Grouping, were used to 
measure social intelligence or the ability to draw impli-
cations from social relationships. 
Two additional scores obtained from an analysis of responses on 
the experimental ta?k were: 
d) Level of Confidence was determined from the judges' subjective 
report as obtained from the confidence rating scale. 
e) Average Number of Cues Utilized was determined by counting 
and averaging the number of signs reported by each subject 
for each symptom statement. 
CHAPTER III 
Results 
Experiment .! 
The results of the test-retest reliability design are presented 
' in Table 1 for the twenty-one subjects who completed both tas~s. The 
results are given according to the Clinician Scale and according to the 
Student Scale. (Each of these Scales was scored on first and second 
testing according to the number of popular responses reported, with a 
possible range of zero to six.) A test-retest correlation of 0.65 was 
obtained for the Clinician Scale (most frequently presented clinician 
responses) using the Pearson product-moment. A test-retest correlation 
of 0.70 was obtained for the comparable Student Scale (most frequently 
presented student responses) . Table l also indicates the percentage 0f 
individual responses which were repeated on the second testing. For 
example, if the characteristic "head emphasis" was reported for the 
symptom statement "He is worried about his intelligence," on both test 
and retest, this was scored as a repetition. Seventy-five percent of 
such popular responses were repeated by subjects on second testing 
utilizing the Clinician Scale, while 72% of the popular responses were 
repeated by the subjects on second testing utilizing the Student Scale. 
This can be compared to the 56% of first responses, popular and non-popular, 
repeated on second testing for all the subjects. 
Additional data from the test-retest design revealed that the 
average number of responses given for each symptom statement on first 
testing was 1.24, while a comparable average of 1.27 responses was given 
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Table 1 
Reliability Coefficients and Percentages of 
Popular and Total Responses Repeated on Both Testings 
Reliability b 
(Number of Popular Responses) 
Percentage of Popular Responses 
Repeated on Both Testings 
Percentage of Total Responses 
Repeated on Both Testings 
Clinician Scale a 
.65 
75% 
56% 
a Formulated from Chapman and Chapman (1967) data. 
b Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. 
Student Scale a 
.70 
72% 
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for each symptom statement on second testi_ng. The average confidence 
level per response on first testing was 3.60, while the figure for 
second testing was slightly less at 3.53: The average number of "No 
Relationship" responses.per subject of first testing was 1.14; on 
second testing, 1.00 "No Relationship" responses were reported by each 
subject. 
Experiment II -- Scale comparisons 
The responses of the 70 questionnaires of Experiment II are given 
in Table 2. The results are presented in terms of percentage of subjects 
who reported each characteristic across the symptom statements. Only the 
most frequently reported characteristics are presented. In addition, the 
percentage of subjects reporting "No Relationship" is also given. Cochran 
Q a..~alyses were computed for each of the descriptive statements to deter-
mine if the response characteristics were randomly distributed among the 
respective symptom statements. The distribution of characteristics across 
each symptom statement was found to be non-random for five of the state-
ments (p< .01 in each case). These results show that the judges saw one 
or more drawing characteristic as occurring with a statement more often 
than any other characteristic. 
A comparison of Table 2 with the Chapmans' data (Table 1, page 196, 
Chapman & Chapman, 1967) shows that the same characteristics tended to be 
reported for the six statements in both studies. One of the Chapmans' 
fifteen characteristics, "phallic limbs," was not reported by the judges 
Table 2 
Percent of Subjects Reporting Each Characteristic According to Symptoms (n=70) 
Fed and Say bad 
Characteristic 1. Manliness 2. Suspicious 3. Intelligence 4. Cared for 5. Impotence 6. things 
l. Manly, muscular 
broad shoulders 68 15 
2. Feminine, child-
like 32 39 
3. Detailed drawing 12 
4. Eyes atypical 42 20 
5. Ears atypical 14 
6. Facial expression 
atypical 18 20 15 31 
7. Head emphasized 53 
8. Mouth emphasized 8 
9. Passive posture 
outstretched arms 18 
10. Sexual area 16 59 
11. Clothing 15 15 
12 . Arms , hands 15 15 
13. Profile 15 
No Relationship 4 8 10 18 10 25 
Cochran Q a 36.09b 14.00b 24.50b 11.02b 43.57b 5.60 
a Cochran Q method was utilized with the three characteristics ("No relationship" responses not included) 
most frequently reported for each of the symptom statements. The Q value represents the probability 
that the frequencies of the responses differ from random distribution. If the observed Q value is 
equal to or greater than the critical value (for p < .01), the implication is that the frequencies of 
the reported characteristics differ significantly among themselves. 
b p < ~01 
w 
0 
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in the present experiment. In addition, the characteristics, "sexual 
area emphasized" and "sexual area deemphasized" have been combined into 
one category "sexual area" due to the difficulty in clearly differen-
tiating judges'· responses into two categories of a sexual nature. 
Table 3 combines summaries of the Chapmans' results and the re~ 
sults of the present study. A comparison is made between the reports of 
the Chapmans' surveyed clinicians, the reports of the Chapmanst experi-
mental subjects, and reports of the present experimental judges, Only 
the three characteristics most frequently reported for each sta.tement 
by judges in each of the above three. groups have been· included. One can 
see a high amount of congruity between the reports of the Chapmans' 
students and the reports of the present student judges. This s:uggests 
experimental reliability in both the Chapmans 1 and the present design. 
Also, once again, there is substantial congruity between the reports of 
surveyed clinicians and the reports of undergraduate students.· Utilizing 
the most frequently reported response for each of the six statements, these 
responses were summed to get scores for both the Clinician Scale and the 
Student Scale. In other words, the reports of the 70 judges were com~­
pared 1n terms of scoring on the Clinician Scale and scoring on the Student 
Scale. A correlation of 0.79 was obtained between these two scorings with 
the Pearson product-moment. This suggests high but not complete agreement 
between clinicians and student judges. Inspection of Tables 2 and 3 
indicates that results from four of the six statements (Numbers 1, 2, 3, and 
5) are more congruent between clinicians and students than are results from 
-·· " 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Percentages of Characteristics 
Reported by Chapmans' Clinicians and Students 
and Present Experimental Group 
Characteristic 
1. Muscular manly 
2. Feminine, childlike 
3. Sexual area 
No Relationshipb 
1. Eyes atypical 
2. Ears atypical 
3. F'acial expression atypical 
No Relationship 
1. Head large or emphasized 
2. Facial expression 
3. Detail 
No Relationship 
1. Mouth emphasized 
2. Feminine, childlike 
3. Passive posture 
No Relationship 
1. Sexual area 
2. Manly, muscular 
3. Feminine, childlike 
No Relationship 
1. Ears atypical 
2. Facial expression atypical 
3. Eyes atypical 
No Relationship 
Clinicians a 
n = 44 
80 
23 
14 
91 
55 
18 
82 
2 
34 
68 
32 
36 
73 
25 
23 
64 
18 
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From Chapman and Chapman (1967). 
Groups 
Students a 
n = 108 
Experimental Group 
n = 70 
1. Manliness 
76 
22 
5 
2. Suspicious 
58 
6 
44 
3. Intelligence 
55 
21 
13 
68 
32 
16 
4 
42 
6 
18 
8 
53 
20 
12 
10 
4. Fed and Cared for 
8 8 
39 
21 
5. Impotence 
35 
31 
25 
6. Say bad things 
39 
18 
18 
59 
15 
8 
10 
7 14 
52 31 
26 20 
25 
a 
b The Chapmans' data did not include a "No Relationship" response. 
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the other two statements (Numbers 4 and 6). This is suggested by 
agreement between clinicians and students on the most popular response 
. 
on these four statements as well as highly significant Cochran Q values, 
and finally by the tendency of experimental judges to give fewer "No 
Relationship" responses on these four statemen~s. In contrast, for the 
two weakest measures of illusory correlation, Statements 4 and 6, 
respectively 18% and 26% of the judges reported observing "No Relationship." 
While the Cochran Q value was significant at the .01 level for Statement 4, 
no characteristic was reported by more than 39% of the judges. 
Experiment _!.!. -- Personality measures 
Utilizing the Clinician Scale (i.e., the characteristic most 
frequently reported by clinical psychologists for each of the six 
statements) the number of illusory populars was computed for each 
subject on a potential scale of zero to six. The top horizontal columns 
of Tables 4 and 5 categorize the 70 judges according to the number of 
populars they gave. The modal number of illusory populars reported was 
two. No reports of six illusory populars were obtained in Experiment II. 
A look at the distribution of reported illusory populars over the Clinician 
Scale suggests a positively skewed distribution of responses. In addition, 
in Tables 4 and 5, the mean scores and standard deviations of five person-
ality-ability measures and two measures derived from the experimental task 
are given for the different values on the Clinician Scale. 
two reported populars) and high (three, four, five, or 
populars) reporters of illusory correlation. This divisio 
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Table 4 
Means, Standard Deviations, and t-Scores of 
Selected Measures for 
Low and High Reporters of Illusory Populars 
Low 
n = 39 
High 
n = 31 
Measure 0-2 Populars Reported 3-6 Populars Reported 
Mean SD Mean SD 
1. Hidden Figures Test 11.14 6.24 12.21 6.51 
2. Expression Grouping 18.87 2.47 19.50 2.49 
3. Cartoon Predictions 23.44 2.37 23.'38 1.90 
4. Similarities 12.95 5.21 13.32 4.37 
5. Alternate Uses 14.10 5.41 16.42 5.42 
6. Average Number of 
Responses Per 
Item 1.42 0.56 1. 70 0.62 
7. Average Confidence 
Per Response 3.21 0.60 3.36 0.46 
a p < .1 
t 
0.70 
1.06 
1.00 
0.31 
l.78a 
a 
1.99 
1.11 
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distribution of reported populars gives 39 low reporters versus 31 
high reporters. The means and standard deviations for each of the five 
personality measures and the two task-derived measures are given, and 
differences in the means of these measures between low and high reporters 
are compared using Student's t-test. Two measures, Alternate ·uses and 
Average Number of Responses Per Item, were found to appr9ach significance 
at the 0.10 level (two-tailed), suggesting a trend for each of these 
measures. No other significant differences in means were found. 
The same results are rearranged and presented in Table 5 according 
to four categories of reported populars {zero-one, two, three, four-six). 
As Table 5 indicates, categories zero and one, as well as four, five, 
and six have been combined due to the low frequencies of reports. Once 
again, the means and standard deviations of the five personality measures 
and the two task-derived measures are given. A one-tailed F-test was used 
to test for significant differences in means of personality measures 
across number of reported illusory populars, with a Newman-Keuls analysis 
(unequal n correction) of the differences between all p~ssible comparisons 
of means. Table 6 presents the F values of these comparisons for the seven 
dependent measures. For Expression Grouping, a measure of social 
intelligence, significant differences were obtained between the means 
of zero-one and two reported illusory populars {p < .005), zero-one and 
four-six reported illusory populars {p < .005), and zero-one and three 
reported illusory populars (p < .025). A significant difference (p < .05) 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations of Selected Measures According to 
Number of·Illusory Populars Reported 
Number of Illusori PoEulars Re~rted 
0-1 2 3 4-6 
n = 13 n = 26 n = 18 n = 13 
Measure Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
·---
1. Hidden Figures Test 11.03 5.95 11.20 7.04 13.32 6.78 10.68 6.04 
2. Expression Grouping 16.92 2.83 19.85 2.47 19.36 2.37 19.69 2.56 
3. Cartoon Predictions 23.05 1.51 23.64 2.63 23.91 1.90 24.05 1.95 
4. Alternate Uses 14.69 5.45 13.81 4.74 16.44 5.71 16.38 4.31 
w 
°' 5. Similarities 12.15 4.00 13.35 S..17 13.83 4.03 12.62 5.51 
6. Average Number of 
Responses Per Item 1.38 .47 1.44 .60 1.54 .so 1.92 .68 
7. Average Confidence 
Per Response 3.34 .44 3.15 .66 3.34 .38 3.38 .60 
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Table 6 
a 
F-Values for the Difference Between Means of Selected Measures 
According to Number of Illusory Populars Reported 
Mean Comparisons of 
Categories of Illusory Populars Reported 
0-1 0-1 0-1 2 2 3 
to to to to to to 
Measure 2 3 4-6 3 4-6 4-6 
1. Hidden Figures Test .17 2.29 .35 2.12 .54 2.64 
b c b 
2. Expression Grouping 2.93 2.44 2. 77 .49 .16 .33 
3. Cartoon Predictions .59 .86 1.00 .27 .41 .14 
4. Alternate Uses .88 1. 75 1.69 2.63 2.57 .06 
5. Similarities 1.20 1.68 .47 .48 .73 1.21 
6. Average Number of d 
Responses Per Item .06 .16 .54 .10 .48 .38 
7. Average Confidence 
Per Response .19 .oo .04 .19 .23 .04 
a 
'Newman-Keuls analysis (unequal n's) 
b p < .005 
c p < .025 
d p < .05 
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was also found between the means of Average Number of Responses Per Item 
for zero-one reported illusory populars and four-six reported illusory 
populars. No other differences were significant. 
The results of Experiment II were further analyzed to determine 
whether a relationship existed between scores on each of the five 
personality measures and the number of "No Relationship" responses 
reported by the experimental judges. Table 7 presents the mean number 
of "No Relationship" responses for high and low scores (median split) 
on each of the five personality measures, and the corresponding 
t-values. None of the differences were significant. 
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Table 7 
Mean Number of "No Relationship" Responses Reported for 
High and Low Scorers on Selected Personality Measures 
Mean Number of "No 
Relationshi:e" ResEonses 
a High a Low Scorers Scorers 
Measure n = 35 n =.35 t 
1. Hidden Pigures 'l'est • 77 .66 .55 
2. Expression Grouping .83 .60 .99 
3. Cartoon Predictions .66 • 77 .55 
4. Alternate Uses .so .63 .82 
5. Similarities .83 .60 1.10 
a Median split. 
CHAPTER IV 
Discussion 
The results of the present study replicate and add validity to the 
data of Chapman· and Chapman (1967). A high amount of congruity can be 
observed between the results of the present design and the results 
presented for the Chapmans' student subjects. Furthermore, the reports 
of the present 70 student judges are once again in high agreement with 
the reports of the Chapmans' surveyed clinicians. A relatively high 
correlation (.79). between clinicians' and students' reports was obtained 
by further investigating the present data with the construction of a 
Clinician Scale and a Student Scale of the most frequently reported 
characteristics. Thus, the evidence of the present study adds further 
support to the illusory correlation hypothesis offered by the Chapmans 
that many clinical interpretations of projective test material have their 
origins in illusory correlations based on naively and intuitively formed 
associative connections. 
The test-retest correlations suggest that the report of an illusory 
relationship is a relatively stable phenomenon. Reliability coefficients 
of .65 (Clinician Scale) and .70 (Student Scale) were obtained for the 
most popular illusory responses. As the data in Table 1 suggest, the 
illusory popular is more reliably reported than are nonpopular reports 
of relationships. According to Clinician-Scale scoring and Student-
Scale scoring, respectively, 75% and 72% of the popular responses 
reported on first administration were again reported by individual 
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subjects on a second administration of the DAP materials. For the total 
responses, including both popular and nonpopular responses, only 56% of 
first responses were again reported on second testing. This difference in 
stability of report £or popular responses and total responses encourages 
the explanation that the symptom-characteristic associative relationship 
of an illusory popular is stronger than the symptom-characteristic associa-
tive relationship of a nonpopular report. In addition, there is evidence 
that the associative strength of characteristic to symptom differentially 
varies for each of the six symptom statements. This suggests that some 
characteristic-symptom populars have st~onger associations than other 
characteristic-symptom populars. For example, ~e illusory populars 
"head-intell:i.gence" and "sexual area-impotence" were reported by a 
greater percentage of the subjects than were the populars "mouth-fed and cared 
for" or "eyes-suspicious." Likewise, there was less tendency to give a 
"No Relationship" response for the symptom-characteristics of greatest 
associative strength. 
The most interesting finding regarding personality-ability measures 
was the marked lack of significant differences between high and low 
reporters of illusory correlation. As the information on Table 4 suggests, 
the high-low dichotomy yielded only trend differences for two measures, 
Alternate Uses and Average Number of Responses per Item. In addition, 
these trend indications were opposite to those offered in the original 
hypotheses; namely, it was hypothesized that low reporters of illusory 
correlation would score higher on these variables than would high reporters 
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of illusory correlation. Since Alternate Uses, as a measure of creative 
productivity, is related in concept to Average Number of Responses per 
Item, what the data seem to suggest, then, is that high reporters of 
illusory correlation tend to see a greater number of characteristic-
symptom relationships in the stimulus material, or, generalizing to the 
clinician's task, in projective test protocols. 
Since a high-low dichotomy may include curvilinear data and thus 
shield true differences, an extended analysis of the number of reported 
illusory populars and personality measures was performed. Tables 5 and 6 pre-
sent this information. Here, the numbe~ of reported populars were grouped 
into four categories -- zero-one, two, three, and four-six reported popu-
lars. Only one personality-ability variable, Exp:r.P.ssion Gr.oupi.ng, whi.ch 
is a measure of social intelligence, was found to differ significantly 
across the number of illusory populars reported. Those who reported zero 
or one popular significantly differed from those reporting two populars 
(p < .005), three populars (p < .025), and four, five, or six populars 
(p < .005). Once again, the original hypothesis that high reporters would 
be more stereotypic and less socially sensitive to cues, and thus less 
socially intelligent was contradicted. According to the present evidence, 
the opposite situation may be suggested; namely, that those judges who report 
few illusory populars (zero-one) manifest less social intelligence than 
judges highly susceptible to the illusory phenomenon. A recent article 
(Ke'lley, 1973) discussing the Chapmans' illusory phenomenon within the 
realm of attribution theory and implicit personality theory lends some 
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support to this suggestion. If the learned associative basis of the 
illusory correlation phenomenon is a result of experience stored as an 
implicit cognitive organization, then perhaps the stronger and more abundant 
the associative cue relationships, the greater the amount of social 
intelligence, which is also sometimes thought to be dependent on relatively 
covert cues. 
Tables 5 and 6 also indicate a trend difference in Average Number 
of Responses per Item. As noted and discussed above, the original hypothesis 
was not supported; the opposite situation was suggested in that high 
reporters of illusory populars gave mor~ responses than did low reporters 
of illusory populars. In utilizing a technique.of self-report other. 
than an opi:m-ended questionnaire, one might be able to discern whet.lier t.l-ie 
number of populars reported is merely a function of increased responses, 
or whether, as the present evidence suggests, is indeed dependent upon 
differential associative response strengths. For example, with a multiple-
choice, one-response-per-item format on the questionnaire the number of 
responses would be the same for all subjects. The probability of reporting 
an illusory correlation would not be inflated by the opportunity to give 
more associations. If results similar to the present results were obtained, 
one could assert with more certainty that the probability of reporting an 
illusory correlation depends upon the associative strength of the character-
istic and symptom. 
Inherent in the definition of illusory correlation is the 
assumption that judges who report "No Relationship" do not see a character-
istic-symptom relationship in the material and thus are not susceptible 
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to the illusory phenomenon. This implies that judges who give a large 
number of "No Relationship" responses should present more of the positive 
qualities associated with the personality-ability measures. However, the 
results presented in Table 7 do not support such an hypothesis. No 
significant differences are evident between high and low scorers on these 
personality-ability measures and the number of "No Relationship" responses 
given. 
The variation in associative strengths of the illusory popular 
characteristics for each of their respective symptom statements (collectively 
identified as the Clinician Scale or the Student Scale) suggests that 
Number of Reported Populars may not represent an homogenous index of 
measurement. If this is indeed the case, the negative findings of the 
majority of the personality measures may not be a correct representation 
of the true case. In order to correct for this, in future research 
utilizing Number of Reported Populars on a DAP task such as the one 
employed here, it is recommended that only the four strongest of the six 
symptom statements be utilized. In addition, experimentation might be 
undertaken to arrange a method of more objective scoring such as a multiple 
selection technique rather than an open-ended questionnaire. 
Future research might also examine the relationship between the 
operational definitions offered by the Chapmans on the DAP, on the 
Rorschach, and by Starr and Katkin (1969) on the Incomplete Sentences 
Blank. It is recormnended that the investigation of the illusory correlation 
phenomenon be extended to other clinical interpretative tasks such as the 
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Thematic Apperception Test {and other TAT-type tests}, to qualitative 
interpretations of WAIS responses, and to interview material itself. 
Finally, it seems more research is needed like that of Golding 
and Rorer '(1972}' in investigating the resistance of illusory correlation 
to corrective training attempts. Contrary to the expectations of this 
study, the present results add little new information on the important 
question of the personality characteristics of the effective clinician. 
The answer may lie more in training than in personality differences. 
Perhaps good clinicians are made, not born. 
Summary 
This study has investigated the relationship of various personality-
ability measures (field dependence, creativity, and social intelligence) 
and the phenomenon of illusory correlation in the context of clinical 
judgment. Chapman and Chapman (1967, 1969) have defined and investigated 
illusory correlation in the clinical judgment of projective test protocols. 
Illusory correlation has been defined as the tendency to report character-
istic-symptom relationships in diagnostic material which in fact do not 
exist in that material or which exist to a lesser extent than that reported. 
The report of an illusory correlation is thought to depend upon the 
characteristics of the stimulus materiai and upon the perceptive qualities 
of the judge. 
The present study attempted to differentiate judges according to 
the nwnber of illusory correlates they reported -- that is, judges highly 
susceptible to the illusory phenomenon and judges less susceptible to the 
illusory phenomenon and to see if high and low reporters of this 
phenomenon differed on five personality-ability measures and two task-
derived measures. It was hypothesized that low reporters of this 
illusory phenomenon would score higher on these personality measures than 
would high reporters of illusory correlation. 
DAP drawings were viewed by 70 undergraduate, male subjects who 
were then divided into groups on the basis of the nwnber of times they 
reported the illusory phenomenon in a subsequent questionnaire. These 
subjects were then given the following measures: Hidden Figures Test 
(field dependence), Expression Grouping and Cartoon Predictions (social 
46 
47 
intelligence), and Alternate Uses and Similarities (creativity). The 
amount of confidence with which a judge gave a response (Average Confidence 
Per Response) and the nwnber of responses given for each symptom statement 
(Average Nwnber of Responses Per Item) were determined from responses on 
the questionnaires. 
The original hypotheses were not supported. Trend indications 
in the direction opposite to that hypothesized were found for Alternate 
Uses (creative productivity) and Average Nwnber of Responses Per Item. 
No other differences were significant. Further investigation revealed 
significant differences between the scores of infrequent reporters and 
more frequent reporters (p < .005, p < .025; both one-tailed) for 
Expression Grouping, a measure of social intelligence. Once again, 
Average Number of Responses Per Item was the only other measure with at 
least a trend indication. The stability of reports of the illusory 
phenomenon was also determined. With test-retest reliabilities of 0.65 and 
0.70 having been obtained for two different methods of scoring. Implications 
of these essentially negative results were discussed, and it was suggested 
that training rather than personality differences may be of more importance 
in determining whether judges are susceptible to illusory correlation. 
Suggestions were also made for future research, including the development 
of other methods of self-report in the questionnaire, the investigation 
of illusory correlation on other diagnostic tasks, and the synthesis of 
present operational definitions of illusory correlation. 
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